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Contrasting Cases1 
Nat Hansen  
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Abstract 
This paper concerns the philosophical significance of a choice about 
how to design the context shifting experiments used by contextualists 
and anti-intellectualists: Should contexts be judged jointly, with 
contrast, or separately, without contrast? Findings in experimental 
psychology suggest (1) that certain contextual features are more 
difficult to evaluate when considered separately, and there are reasons 
to think that one feature—stakes or importance—that interests 
contextualists and anti-intellectualists is such a difficult to evaluate 
attribute, and (2) that joint evaluation of contexts can yield judgments 
that are more reflective and rational in certain respects. With those two 
points in mind, a question is raised about what source of evidence 
provides better support for philosophical theories of how contextual 
features affect knowledge ascriptions and evidence: Should we prefer 
evidence consisting of “ordinary” judgments, or more reflective, 
perhaps more rational judgments? That question is answered in relation 
to different accounts of what such theories aim to explain, and it is 
concluded that evidence from contexts evaluated jointly should be an 
important source of evidence for contextualist and anti-intellectualist 
theories, a conclusion that is at odds with the methodology of some 
recent studies in experimental epistemology. 
 
                                                        
1 Thanks to Zed Adams, Jonas Åkerman, James Beebe, Gunnar Björnsson, Mikkel 
Gerken, Chauncey Maher and Eliot Michaelson for helpful comments. Special 
thanks to Mark Phelan for comments and discussion. 
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1 Background: Experiments & Context 
The empirical foundation of the debate over the nature and extent 
of context sensitivity in natural language rests in large part on data 
generated primarily by experiments of a certain kind: context 
shifting experiments.2 Context shifting experiments are devised to 
isolate the effects of some particular feature of context on 
particular kinds of judgments about specified features of the 
context. So, for example, a context shifting experiment might vary 
what’s at stake for participants in a conversational context, or 
whether some possibility of error has been mentioned, and elicit 
metalinguistic judgments concerning some semantic or pragmatic 
property of the use of a target expression when those features are 
varied: what some particular use of a sentence says; whether it says 
something true or false (or neither); how acceptable the use of the 
expression in each context is, and so on.3 As long as there aren’t 
more plausible non-linguistic explanations of those judgments, 
they are evidence of underlying semantic and pragmatic 
phenomena that linguistic theories aim to explain (Ludlow, 2011, 
ch. 3). 
Alternatively, instead of eliciting judgments about linguistic 
features of the context (e.g., whether what is said is true or 
acceptable), one might elicit judgments about some non-linguistic 
aspect of the context, such as whether some character in the story 
knows something, or how confident she should be that something is 
the case (rather than whether what is said by a use of a sentence 
                                                        
2 “Context shifting experiments” are a part of (and the name is derived from) what 
Cappelen and Lepore (2005, p. 10) call “Context Shifting Arguments”. A Context 
Shifting Argument takes the data generated by a context shifting experiment as a 
premise. 
 
3 For discussion of metalinguistic judgments, see Birdsong (1989) and Schütze 
(1996, Ch. 3). 
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ascribing knowledge or confidence is true or false).4 
Some of the experimental philosophers who have investigated the 
claims of anti-intellectualism—the view that whether one counts as 
knowing a proposition, or the quality of one’s evidence in favor of 
the proposition, partly depends on the “stakes” or practical costs of 
getting it wrong— employ this kind of context shifting experiment 
(May et al., 2010; Phelan 2013). 
The goal of context shifting experiments is to set up conditions so 
that the effects (if there are any) of changing specific features of 
the relevant context (the independent variable) on judgments (the 
dependent variable) can be observed. Contextualists and their 
opponents then go on to try to explain those observed effects using 
their preferred theoretical resources: indexicality, free enrichment, 
occasion-sensitivity, conversational implicature, focal bias, and so 
on.5 
Many context shifting experiments have been conducted 
informally, from the theorist’s armchair. But with increasing 
frequency, formal versions of context shifting experiments have 
                                                        
4 Hazlett (2010, pp. 497-8) distinguishes “two competing methods of theorizing in 
epistemology—one based on intuitions about knowledge, and the other based on 
intuitions about language”. DeRose argues that only meta-linguistic context 
shifting experiments yield data that can confirm or disconfirm predictions made by 
his particular variety of contextualism. For his argument, see DeRose (2009, p. 49 
n. 2) and (2011, pp. 84–85). Sosa (2000, p. 1) characterizes contextualism as 
engaging in “metalinguistic ascent”, whereby it “replaces a given question with a 
related but different question. About words that formulate one’s original question, 
the contextualist asks when those words are correctly applicable”. Sosa goes on to 
say that there are questions, like the nature of justification, that the epistemologist 
can discuss “with no metalinguistic detour” (p. 6). 
5 I say “relevant” context because theorists with different theoretical commitments 
vary elements of different kinds of contexts: the context of utterance (DeRose 
1992, 2009, e.g.), or the context of the subject who is said to know (Stanley 2005, 
e.g.). 
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been conducted with all the apparatus of contemporary psychology 
at their disposal. The turn to formal versions of context shifting 
experiments is motivated on one hand by a general skepticism 
about the reliability of philosophers’ intuitions and on the other by 
the need to respond to such skepticism (see Hansen and Chemla, 
forthcoming, for discussion of such skepticism as well as 
vindications of certain armchair judgments about context shifting 
experiments). One side effect of the turn to more formal 
experiments is that it has drawn attention to subtle but important 
elements of the design of context shifting experiments that have 
been largely overlooked in their informal use. As an illustration of 
the features of a context shifting experiment that are brought into 
relief when they are adopted for use in formal experiments, 
consider the highlighted features of the following much-discussed 
context shifting experiment introduced by Keith DeRose (1992, 
2009): 
 
Bank Case A. My wife and I are driving home on a Friday afternoon. We plan to 
stop at the bank on the way home to deposit our paychecks. But as we drive past 
the bank, we notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday 
afternoons. Although we generally like to deposit our paychecks as soon as 
possible, it is not especially important in this case that they be deposited right 
away, so I suggest that we drive straight home and deposit our paychecks on 
Saturday morning. My wife says, ‘Maybe the bank won’t be open tomorrow. Lots 
of banks are closed on Saturdays’. I reply, ‘No, I know it’ll be open. I was just 
there two weeks ago on Saturday. It’s open until noon.’ [The bank is open on 
Saturday.] 
Bank Case B. My wife and I drive past the bank on a Friday afternoon, as in Case 
A, and notice the long lines. I again suggest that we deposit our paychecks on 
Saturday morning, explaining that I was at the bank on Saturday morning only two 
weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon. But in this case, we have 
just written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are not 
deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check 
we wrote will bounce, leaving us in a very bad situation. And, of course, the bank 
is not open on Sunday. My wife reminds me of these facts. She then says, ‘Do you 
know the bank will be open tomorrow?’ Remaining as confident as I was before 
that the bank will be open then, still, I reply, ‘Well, no, I don’t know. I’d better go 
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in and make sure’. [The bank is open on Saturday.]6 
 
The metalinguistic judgments DeRose expects us to make in 
response to the “bank” context shifting experiment—truth value 
judgments about the sentences in boldface—are supposed to 
provide evidence of the context sensitivity of the word “know”. 
 
But there are two asymmetries between the two contexts DeRose 
describes that make it difficult to isolate the effect that changes in 
the context of utterance have on metalinguistic judgments about 
the target sentences. 
 
First, in addition to varying specific features of the contexts of 
utterance, DeRose also varies the sentences that are supposed to be 
evaluated in each context (those that I have marked in boldface). 
He varies the polarity of the sentences (“I know...” vs. “I don’t 
know. . . ”), whether there is anaphoric reference to the bank (“it”) 
and what linguistic material is elided (“I know it’ll be open 
[tomorrow]” vs. “I don’t know [the bank will be open 
tomorrow]”), and whether the discourse marker “Well,...” is 
present.7 Varying all of those linguistic elements makes it harder to 
defend the idea that it is the change in the context of utterance that 
is affecting our judgments about the uses of the sentences, rather 
than the changes DeRose makes in the sentences that are used (or 
                                                        
6 I have added boldface to pick out the sentences we’re supposed to evaluate, and I 
have underlined the sentences where the character in the stories who claims to 
know or denies that he knows gives evidence in support of the proposition that the 
bank will be open tomorrow. 
7 For a discussion of the pragmatic significance of the discourse marker “well”, see 
Jucker (1993). Thanks to Emma Borg for bringing this paper to my attention. 
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some combination of both factors). 
Second, the underlined sentences are where the character in the 
story who claims to know the bank will be open tomorrow states 
evidence in support of the proposition that the bank will be open 
tomorrow. But those statements differ subtly in how they are 
worded, occur in different places in the story, and the statement in 
Case A is in direct discourse, while the statement in Case B is in 
indirect discourse. The statement of evidence is arguably more 
salient in Case A, where DeRose’s judgment is that he knows that 
the bank will be open, while it is less salient in Case B, where 
DeRose’s judgment is that he does not know the bank will be open. 
It is possible that simply locating that statement in different places 
in the story affects our judgment of whether or not the character’s 
statement that he knows the bank will be open is true. 
This is not to argue that these factors do affect our judgments in 
these cases, only that they make it more difficult to isolate the 
effect that changing the context has on our judgments. Anyone 
interested in identifying those effects should revise their context 
shifting experiments accordingly, so that as little as possible is 
varied between contexts except for the relevant features of the 
context of utterance (in DeRose’s investigation of “know”, those 
features are the stakes and whether a possibility of error is 
mentioned).8 
Even once the unnecessary asymmetries between the contexts 
being evaluated are eliminated, there remain questions about how 
subtle features of experimental design affect judgments. For 
example, there is evidence that the order in which scenarios are 
presented (Schwitzgebel and Cushman, 2012), whether the 
                                                        
8 More recent context shifting experiments avoid these asymmetries. See, e.g., 
Sripada and Stanley (forthcoming) and the context shifting experiment discussed 
below, taken from Phelan (2013). 
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sentences participants are asked to judge are positive or negative 
(Hansen and Chemla, forthcoming), and whether participants only 
see contexts separately (without contrast) or jointly (with contrast) 
(Phelan, 2013) can significantly affect judgments about them. In 
this paper, I will consider this final feature of the design of context 
shifting experiments—whether to employ separate or joint 
evaluation of contexts—in detail. I will first describe reasons to 
think that separate evaluation (involved in experiments with a 
between-subjects design) is the better design for context shifting 
experiments because it more closely resembles the structure of 
ordinary judgments (which do not involve explicit comparisons 
between contexts). I will then draw on findings in experimental 
psychology to argue that joint evaluation of contexts can yield 
judgments that are more “rational” in certain respects. With those 
two arguments in place, it is then possible to raise a question about 
which experimental design generates better evidence for 
contextualist and anti-intellectualist theories: Should the evidence 
consist of “ordinary” judgments, or more reflective, perhaps more 
“rational” judgments? How one answers that question depends on 
what one understands the explanatory project of contextualist and 
anti-intellectualist theories to be. In the final section of the paper, 
I’ll describe two different ways of understanding those explanatory 
projects and how they bear on the question of what kinds of 
experiments provide the best evidence for such theories. 
2 DeRose on Joint vs. Separate Evaluation of Contexts 
DeRose says that when his contextualist scenarios (like the bank 
scenario discussed above) are considered separately, the intuitions 
that they generate are “fairly strong” (DeRose 2005, p. 175/2009, 
p. 49) “fairly clear” (DeRose, 2005, p. 193), or “quite strong” 
(DeRose 1999, p. 196, 2009, p. 55 n. 7).9 But he worries that if the 
two contexts that make up a context shifting experiment are 
                                                        
9 See also DeRose (2009, p. 2). 
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considered jointly, we may become less certain of our intuitions 
about the two contexts: 
Of course, we may begin to doubt the intuitions above when we consider [the 
contexts] together, wondering whether the claim to know in the first case and the 
admission that I don’t know in the second can really both be true (DeRose 2002, p. 
195 n. 6/2009 p. 55 n. 7). 
One interesting feature of DeRose’s remarks is that he doesn’t say 
whether he finds joint or separate evaluation of contexts (if either) 
preferable. His practice favors joint evaluation: The informal 
presentation of DeRose’s context shifting experiments (indeed, of 
all the informal context shifting experiments in the contextualist 
debate) require judgments about contexts that are presented 
jointly.10 But I get the feeling that DeRose would prefer that the 
contexts be considered individually, since that would, by his own 
account, produce intuitions that more strongly aligned with his 
predictions. And DeRose is committed to a view about what 
constitutes the best evidence for contextualist theories which lends 
support to the practice of using context shifting experiments that 
present contexts separately: 
The best grounds for accepting contextualism come from how knowledge-
attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, non-
philosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as ‘knowledge’ in some 
non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others. 
This type of basis in ordinary language not only provides the best grounds 
we have for accepting contextualism concerning knowledge attributions, but, I 
believe, is evidence of the very best type one can have for concluding that any 
piece of ordinary language has context-sensitive truth-conditions (DeRose 2005, p. 
172/2009, pp. 47–48). 
Given that DeRose thinks that the “best grounds for accepting 
contextualism come from how...sentences are used in ordinary, 
                                                        
10 It would be awkward (though not impossible) to craft a paper in which readers 
only saw one or the other context by itself. 
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non-philosophical talk”, and given that, as Daniel Kahneman puts 
it, “We normally experience life in the between-subjects mode, in 
which contrasting alternatives are absent” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 
354), it seems plausible that DeRose should think that context 
shifting experiments that present contexts separately generate 
better grounds for contextualism than context shifting experiments 
that present contexts jointly.11 
Further support for this idea can be found in recent experimental 
philosophy, where it has been explicitly argued that evidence 
gathered from context shifting experiments that evaluate contexts 
separately is preferable to evidence gathered from joint evaluation 
of contexts. 
3 Experimenting with Separate and Joint Evaluation 
Phelan (2013) conducted a series of experiments that revealed 
significant effects of a feature of context invoked in certain context 
shifting experiments, namely practical importance, or what is at 
stake, in contexts evaluated jointly. But those effects disappeared 
when each of the contexts making up the context shifting 
experiment was considered separately, in a “non-juxtaposed” 
experimental design. Phelan’s finding of no significant difference 
between responses to contexts when those contexts are evaluated 
separately lines up with other recent experimental results 
concerning anti-intellectualism about knowledge (Feltz and 
Zarpentine, 2010) and contextualism about knowledge ascriptions 
(Buckwalter, 2010), both of which relied exclusively on separate 
evaluation of contexts. 
In this section, I will describe Phelan’s findings. Later, I will argue 
that while Phelan’s findings may suggest a problem for using 
                                                        
11 For other examples of the claim that everyday life resembles a between-subjects 
experiment, see Kahneman (2000, p. 682) and Shafir (1998, p. 72). 
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contrasting cases in the design of context shifting experiments, it 
isn’t at all obvious whether that problem is genuine.12 
Phelan takes as his target the “anti-intellectualist” view that the 
practical importance, or “cost” or “stakes”, of being right or wrong 
about a proposition has an effect on one’s evidence supporting the 
proposition (p. 3).13 Anti-intellectualism about evidence is 
motivated in part by judgments about context shifting experiments 
in which only the practical importance (or “stakes”, or “costs”) of 
being right about a proposition is varied between contexts. For 
example (given certain assumptions14) the anti-intellectualist view 
targeted by Phelan would predict that judgments about how 
confident the character Kate is in the following two contexts 
should vary in the following way: In the Unimportant context, 
Kate should be more confident that she is on Main Street than she 
is in the Important context. (The italicized material in the contexts 
that follow is not present in the version given to participants. I 
follow Phelan in underlining material that varies in the two 
contexts; the material that follows is the same in both contexts.) 
 
Unimportant (Passerby): Kate is ambling down the street, out on a walk for no 
                                                        
12 An early, unpublished (but often cited) version of Phelan’s study (Neta and 
Phelan, Ms.) contains the claim that their studies “obviously suggest a problem for the 
philosophical strategy of [using] contrasting cases to elicit intuitions in support of one 
position or another” (p. 24). 
13 Phelan discusses two subtly different versions of this view, “Anti-intellectualism 
about Evidence”, given in Stanley (2005) and Stanley (2007). 
14 In order for anti-intellectualism about evidence to make testable predictions 
about ordinary judgments, Phelan introduces what he calls the “Bridge from 
Rational Confidence to Evidence (BRCE): People’s implicit commitments about 
an agent’s evidence set or quality of evidence are reflected in their explicit 
intuitive judgments about how confident that agent ought to be in various 
propositions supported by that evidence” (p. 7). The BRCE allows Phelan to draw 
conclusions about people’s commitments about evidence from their judgments 
about how confident subjects ought to be. 
 11 
particular reason and with no particular place to go. 
Important (Passerby): Kate needs to get to Main Street by noon: her life depends 
on it. 
She comes to an intersection and asks a passerby the name of the street. “Main 
street”, the passerby says. Kate looks at her watch, and it reads 11:45 AM. Kate’s 
eyesight is perfectly normal, and she sees her watch clearly. Kate’s hearing is 
perfectly normal, and she hears the passerby quite well. She has no special reason 
to believe that the passerby is inaccurate. She also has no special reason to believe 
that her watch is inaccurate. Kate could gather further evidence that she is on Main 
Street (she could, for instance, find a map), but she doesn’t do so, since, on the 
basis of what the passerby tells her, she already thinks that she is on Main Street. 
 
Phelan goes about attempting to verify the prediction by asking 
participants in his experiment to rate, on a 7-point Likert scale 
(anchored at 1 with “not confident” and at 7 with “very 
confident”), how confident the character Kate should be that she is 
on Main Street. He found no significant difference between 
judgments about Kate’s confidence in the two contexts when each 
participant was asked to judge only one of the two contexts.15 
But, interestingly, Phelan found that changing the stakes had a 
significant effect on judgments of confidence in “juxtaposed 
cases”, when participants were allowed to jointly evaluate both the 
Unimportant and Important contexts.16 Phelan then ran two 
                                                        
15 The usual caveats about drawing conclusions from null results apply here. 
16 Phelan reports that the mean responses to the important and unimportant 
contexts were 4.5 and 5.32, respectively, with p < .001. Emmanuel Chemla and I 
(Hansen and Chemla forthcoming) uncovered a similar result with truth value 
judgments about knowledge ascriptions using several different context shifting 
experiments based on DeRose’s bank scenario. We found a significant effect of 
changing contexts on truth value judgments about bank-style scenarios only when 
participants had the chance to make judgments about multiple contexts. In our 
experiment, unlike Phelan’s, participants never saw two contexts simultaneously. 
Instead, over the course of the experiment, participants in our experiment made 
judgments about knowledge ascriptions in response to 16 bank-style contexts. 
Hsee et al. (1999, p. 576 n. 1) says the kind of evaluation mode we used 
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additional context shifting experiments testing for the effects of 
changing stakes, but which differed from the scenario described 
above in terms of the reliability of the information source that 
supplies Kate with the information that she’s on Main Street. In the 
second version, it is a pair of “drunks” who tell Kate that she is on 
Main Street, while in the third version, Kate gets her information 
about what street she’s on from a street sign. In each experiment, 
there was a significant difference in responses to the important and 
unimportant contexts when participants saw them “juxtaposed”, 
but that difference disappeared when they saw them separately. 
As Phelan points out, his findings are interesting because the 
context shifting experiments that involve joint evaluation of 
contexts more closely mirror the standard, informal set up of 
context shifting experiments. Those reading a philosophy paper, 
for example, form their judgments while having multiple contexts 
simultaneously in view.17 One might conclude that philosophers 
who unreflectively employ informal context shifting experiments 
with joint evaluation of contexts are mistakenly offering theories 
that aim to explain what turns out to be merely an artifact of their 
particular experimental design, rather than a fact about judgments 
made in ordinary circumstances.18  
4 Why is Contrast a Problem? 
Here is a schematic representation of central results of Phelan’s 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“involve[s] a JE [Joint Evaluation] flavor because individuals evaluating a later 
option may recall the previous option and make a comparison”. 
 
17 Stanley’s (2005) bank context shifting experiment involves considering five 
related contexts. 
18 As mentioned above, Neta and Phelan (Ms.) draw just such a conclusion from 
observations about the role played by joint evaluation in judgments about the effect of 
stakes on confidence.  
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experimental study: 
• Changing stakes do not have a significant effect on judgments of 
confidence about contexts when participants see those contexts 
separately, without contrast. 
• Changing stakes do have a significant effect on judgments of 
confidence about contexts when participants see those contexts 
jointly, with contrast. 
Phelan infers that it is problematic for philosophers to cite the 
effect of changing stakes on judgments of confidence seen in 
jointly considered contrasting cases in support of a theory like anti-
intellectualism about evidence. But that inference is only 
reasonable given a commitment to the idea that effects that only 
show up in “juxtaposed” contrasting cases do not reveal genuine 
effects of stakes on judgments of confidence. Why accept that 
commitment? 
Phelan considers two arguments that defend the importance of 
effects that show up only in contexts considered jointly, and he 
criticizes and rejects both. I’ll briefly sketch both arguments and 
his responses before developing a third argument in favor of 
embracing effects that show up only in contexts considered jointly 
that avoids Phelan’s criticisms. 
First, one might argue that the effect of changing stakes on 
judgments of confidence emerges only in contexts considered 
jointly because only then are stakes salient. When contexts are 
evaluated separately, the stakes are not a particularly prominent 
feature of the context and so do not end up affecting judgments of 
confidence. 19 Second, one might argue that when evaluating 
                                                        
19 Sripada and Stanley (forthcoming, pp. 6–7) make an argument along these lines, 
defending anti- intellectualism against experimental results indicating that stakes 
do not affect judgments about knowledge based only on separate evaluation of 
contexts. 
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contexts separately, participants are uncertain how to respond, and 
so make judgments that “land, more or less arbitrarily, somewhere 
in the middle of the scale” (p. 11).20 But when evaluating contexts 
jointly, they have “more guidance”, and so better represent the role 
that stakes play in affecting judgments of confidence.21 
Phelan responds to both of these arguments by comparing 
responses to the non-juxtaposed contexts in the three versions of 
his context shifting experiment that differ in terms of the reliability 
of the information source that provides Kate the information that 
she is on Main Street. He observes that, even in contexts 
considered separately, the mean responses of how confident Kate 
should be that she is on Main Street track the reliability of the 
source of her information that she is on Main Street: “[T]he mean 
value of participants’ answers for the non-juxtaposed cases 
involving the highly reliable street sign (5.7) was higher than that 
for cases involving the moderately reliable passerby (5.02), which 
was higher than that for the unreliable drunks (4.56)” (p. 12). 
Phelan found that there was a significant effect of the reliability of 
the information source on responses in “non-juxtaposed” cases, but 
no significant effect of importance. He then takes that finding to 
support the denial of the consequent in the following conditional: 
 
[I]f participants’ responses to a single case do not properly reflect the extent to 
which stakes matter, then they should also not properly reflect the extent to which 
                                                        
20 DeRose (2011, p. 94) hilariously calls this kind of response the“WTF?! neutral 
response”. 
21 Ludlow (2011, p. 75) gives an example of how joint evaluation can improve 
subjects’ understanding of an experimental task: “As reported in Spencer (1973), 
Hill (1961) notes that sentences drawn from Syntactic Structures drew mixed 
results from experimental subjects. ‘The child seems sleeping’ was accepted by 4 
of the 10 subjects until it was paired with ‘The child seems to be sleeping’ at 
which point all 10 subjects vote negatively. Establishing the contrast helped the 
subjects to see what the task demand was”. 
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other, equally salient, factors matter (p. 12). 
 
But, because both the antecedent and consequent of the conditional 
involve negations, it is easier to see what’s going on here if you to 
take the experiment to affirm the antecedent of the conditional’s 
contrapositive: 
If participants’ responses to a single case properly reflect the extent to which 
factors that are equally salient to stakes matter, then they should also properly 
reflect the extent to which stakes matter. 
 
Participants in Phelan’s experiments had significantly different 
responses about how confident a character should be when she 
received information about what street she was on from sources of 
varying reliability (a drunk, a normal passerby, and a street sign), 
and they did so in contexts presented separately. If reliability of 
the information source in a context is as salient as what is at stake, 
then Phelan has good reason to affirm the antecedent of the 
(rewritten) conditional and conclude that participants’ responses to 
a single case properly reflect the extent to which stakes matter. Put 
another way, without some reason to think that participants’ 
responses to stakes and reliability of information source differ 
systematically, “it would be ad hoc to claim that they do not . . . 
notice, or do not properly respond to, the stakes in the single cases” 
(p. 13). 
 
A key part of Phelan’s argument is the assumption that the 
reliability of information sources is equally as salient as what is at 
stake. If there is reason to reject that assumption, then his argument 
against the idea that judgments about contexts presented separately 
do not properly reflect the extent to which stakes matter is not 
convincing. I will present some reasons to reject that assumption in 
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the following section. 
5 Further Case Studies on Separate and Joint Evaluation 
Hsee et al. (1999, pp. 583–4) discuss several experiments in which 
switching from separate to joint evaluation corresponds not just 
with a significant difference in judgments, but with a reversal in 
the judgments of participants. So, for example, when participants 
in an experiment (conducted in Hsee 1998) were asked to judge 
how much they would be willing to pay for each of the two sets of 
dinnerware in Table 1, they judged set J to be more valuable when 
the sets were presented jointly. 
 
But when participants only saw one or the other set of tableware 
and asked to judge how much they would be willing to pay for 
them, judgments were reversed: Participants were willing to pay 
more for Set S than for Set J (Hsee, 1998; Hsee et al., 1999; 
Kahneman, 2011). Hsee et al. (1999, p. 584) notes that even 
though Set J contains all the pieces in Set S plus six additional 
intact cups and one more intact saucer, participants were willing to 
pay more for Set S when the sets were considered separately, 
“although it was the inferior option”. 
Or consider another experiment from Hsee (1998), which “asked 
students to imagine that they were relaxing on a beach by Lake 
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Michigan and were in the mood for some ice cream” (Hsee, et al. 
1999, p. 583). Like the Tableware experiment, some participants 
were asked to judge how much they were willing to pay for each of 
two ice cream servings offered by two vendors presented jointly, 
while others were asked to judge how much they were willing to 
pay for one or the other serving option, presented separately (see 
Table 2).  
 
Both serving options were accompanied by a drawing depicting the 
serving. Hsee et al. (1999, p. 583) reports the findings of the earlier 
study as follows: 
Note that, objectively speaking, Vendor J’s serving dominated Vendor S’s, 
because it had more ice cream (and also offered a larger cup). However, J’s 
serving was underfilled, and S’s serving was overfilled. The results revealed a 
JE/SE [Joint Evaluation/Separate Evaluation] reversal: In JE [Joint Evaluation], 
people were willing to pay more for Vendor J’s serving, but in SE [Separate 
Evaluation], they were willing to pay more for Vendor S’s serving. 
What accounts for this (and many other) reversals in judgment 
between separate and joint evaluation of cases? The answer given 
in (Hsee et al., 1999, p. 578) turns on the fact that “some attributes. 
. . are easy to evaluate independently, whereas other attributes. . . 
are more difficult to evaluate independently”. For example, 
whether a particular set of table- ware has broken pieces or 
whether an ice cream cup is overfilled is easy to evaluate 
independently, while the significance of the total number of pieces 
in a set of tableware, or “the desirability of a given amount of ice 
cream”, is more difficult to evaluate independently. 
Whether an attribute is easy or difficult to evaluate, according to 
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Hsee, et al., “depends on the type and the amount of information 
the evaluators have about the attribute”. Relevant information 
includes which value for the attribute would be evaluatively 
neutral, what the best and worst values for the attribute would be, 
and “any other information that helps the evaluator map a given 
value of the attribute onto the evaluation scale” (p. 578). An 
extremely difficult attribute to evaluate would be one where the 
judge has no information about the upper and lower values the 
attribute can have, or what the average value of the attribute would 
be. So, for example, suppose you were asked to judge how suitable 
a candidate is for entry into philosophy B.A. program based solely 
on her score of 15 on her French baccalauréat général.22 
Unfortunately you don’t know what a good or bad score on the bac 
would be, or even what the average is. You only know that higher 
scores are better. Suppose also that you also don’t get to compare 
the candidate with any others—she’s the only French applicant to 
the program. In this situation, any judgment would be a stab in the 
dark—there’s no grounds on which to give the candidate either a 
positive or a negative evaluation. 
 
Your job is easier if you know what the average, neutral value for 
the attribute is, even if you don’t know what the highest and lowest 
values for the attribute would be. Given a particular score, you can 
then easily judge whether it falls above or below the average, and 
correspondingly give it a positive or negative evaluation. So 
suppose you know that the average score on the bac is 11. Now 
you can evaluate the student’s score of 15 positively, but you have 
no way to judge how positively it should be evaluated. 
Still easier is a situation in which you know not only the average 
                                                        
22 This example is based on an experiment conducted in Hsee et al (1999), 
concerning evaluations of a foreign applicant to a University who has taken an 
“Academic Potential Exam” in her home country. 
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score, but scores on the high and low end of what is possible: 
In the baccalauréat général, ten out of twenty is a pass. . . 16 is a très bien 
(summa cum laude), a big bouquet of starred As in the British system. Cambridge 
expects 17 from a French bachelier (Harding, 2012). 
Now you are in a position to make a much more nuanced 
evaluation of the applicant’s score. It’s quite good—not fantastic, 
but good enough for this program (it’s not Cambridge, after all). 
With a more concrete sense of the kind of information that makes 
an attribute easy or difficult to evaluate, we can then ask whether 
there is any reason to think that what’s at stake in a context is more 
difficult to evaluate than the reliability of an information source. I 
think the answer is that it is more difficult to evaluate what’s at 
stake. First of all, the reliability of an information source has a 
clear upper and lower bound: a source can be 100% reliable, or 
completely unreliable, never producing the correct answer. Given a 
particular information source (a drunk, an ordinary passerby, a 
street sign), it is possible to make an informed (if rough) judgment 
about where that information source falls on the (upper and lower 
bounded) scale of reliability, even without comparing it to the 
reliability of other information sources.   In contrast, there is no 
clear upper bound to what can be at stake in a context. It seems 
that there is a lower bound: Nothing might turn on whether a 
proposition turns out to be true or false. That seems to be an 
element of the “Unimportant” context Phelan describes. But, on 
the other end of the scale, what’s the most important thing that 
could turn on whether or not a proposition is true or false? 
Certainly whether someone lives or dies is important, but there’s 
always something more important (two people’s lives, a million, 
the fate of the country, the planet, the universe, all possible 
universes. . . ). Since there’s no clear upper bound, there’s also no 
clear sense of what something of average importance would be. So 
when a participant in a survey is asked to make a judgment about a 
single context in which what’s at stake is mentioned, that attribute 
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counts as difficult to evaluate, in contrast with the reliability of an 
information source, which is (comparatively) easy to evaluate.23 
Phelan wants to defend the idea that responses to contexts 
considered separately provide better evidence for anti-
intellectualism than cases considered jointly. He responds to the 
idea that joint evaluation might make subjects better equipped to 
evaluate what’s at stake in a context as follows (this is my 
reconstruction of his response): 
1. If participants’ responses to a single case do not properly 
reflect the extent to which stakes matter, then they should 
also not properly reflect the extent to which other, equally 
salient, factors matter (p. 18). 
2. The reliability of an information source is as salient as what 
is at stake in a context. 
3. Participants’ responses to a single case do properly reflect the 
reliability of a relevant information source. 
 
Conclusion: Participants’ responses to a single case do 
properly reflect the extent to which stakes matter. 
 
The upshot of the discussion of what makes an attribute easy or 
difficult to evaluate in this section is that premise (2) in Phelan’s 
argument is false, assuming that the ease or difficulty of evaluating 
an attribute is a suitable construal of Phelan’s notion of “salience”. 
                                                        
23 Hsee et al. (1999, p. 580) observe that the fact that an attribute is difficult to 
evaluate does not mean that subjects do not understand what the attribute means: 
“For example, everybody knows what money is and how much a dollar is worth, 
but the monetary attribute of an option can be difficult to evaluate if the decision 
maker does not know the evalaubility information for that attribute in the given 
context. Suppose, for instance, that a person on a trip to a foreign country has 
learned that a particular hotel room costs $50 a night and needs to judge the 
desirability of this price. If the person is not familiar with the hotel prices of that 
country, it will be difficult for him to evaluate whether $50 is a good or bad price”. 
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The reliability of an information source is easier to evaluate than 
what is at stake. That explains why the effect of changing the 
reliability of the relevant information source shows up in separate 
evaluation, while the effects of changing stakes only show up in 
joint evaluation.24 So Phelan’s argument that responses to contexts 
considered separately do properly reflect the extent to which stakes 
matter (in contrast with responses elicited in contexts considered 
jointly) should be resisted. But that’s only to say that there isn’t yet 
a convincing argument that separate evaluation should be favored 
over joint evaluation—so far, it’s still an open question whether 
data gathered using separate or joint evaluation is better evidence 
for contextualism and anti-intellectualism. 
6 Which Type of Evaluation Generates Better Evidence for 
Contextualism and Anti-Intellectualism? 
Phelan observed that changing stakes only seemed to have an 
effect on judgments about confidence when contexts were 
evaluated jointly. He then argued that the effect of stakes observed 
in contexts evaluated separately does genuinely reflect the effect of 
what’s at stake on judgments about confidence. In the last section I 
challenged that argument. Now, in this section, I will consider 
another argument that tries to show that effects that show up in 
contexts considered separately are better evidence for contextualist 
and anti-intellectualist theories than effects that show up only in 
contexts evaluated jointly. 
                                                        
24 Hsee et al (1999) conducted an experiment that tested for effects of different 
types of evaluability information that subjects might have, corresponding to the 
three situations described above: no information, information about average 
scores, and best and worst score information. Their flat (no significant difference 
between scores) result for the no information situation parallels Phelan’s result for 
evaluations of contexts involving different stakes considered separately, whereas 
the significant differences they observed between evaluations of different scores in 
the situation where participants had information about best and worst scores 
parallels Phelan’s result for separate evaluation of contexts involving sources of 
information of varying reliability. 
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Here is my reconstruction of the argument, which is implicit in 
DeRose’s remarks concerning “the best grounds for accepting 
contextualism” and his attitude towards contexts considered 
separately and jointly (introduced in §2, above): 
1. The best grounds for accepting contextualism come from 
how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) 
sentences are used in ordinary, non-philosophical talk 
(DeRose 2005, p. 172/2009, p. 47).  
2. Contexts evaluated separately (and not contexts evaluated 
jointly) accurately represent how subjects use ordinary, non-
philosophical talk.  
3. So data gathered from contexts considered separately (and 
not contexts considered jointly) provides the best grounds for 
accepting contextualism.  
 
DeRose does not explicitly commit himself to premise 2., but as 
discussed above, I think there is reason to think he implicitly 
accepts it. 
Embracing this argument would mean that the proper design of 
context shifting experiments (both informal and formal) should 
involve separate evaluation of contexts, and not joint evaluation. 
I now want to challenge premise (1) in (my reconstruction of) 
DeRose’s argument by giving reasons to think that, for certain 
purposes, data generated by joint evaluation of contexts should be 
at least on the same footing as (if not considered superior to) data 
generated by separate evaluation of contexts. The essential move in 
my argument can be summarized by the following remark from 
Kahneman (2011, p. 361): 
…rationality is generally served by broader and more comprehensive frames, and 
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joint evaluation is obviously broader than single evaluation.25 
 
Subjects tend to make better, more informed, more “rational” 
judgments about contexts when they are given more than one 
context to evaluate. This idea was present in the earlier discussion 
of judgments about the value of the two sets of tableware and the 
different ice cream options: When considered side by side, ice 
cream option J is obviously preferable, and participants select it, 
but when considered separately, subjects do not choose the 
dominant option, they choose the “objectively inferior option” 
(Hsee et al. 1999, p. 588). That is a clear illustration of how being 
able to evaluate options jointly can lead to improved judgments.26 
                                                        
25 In Kahneman’s Nobel Prize lecture, he makes a claim that can seem like it’s in 
tension with this idea. He says, 
…intuitive judgments and preferences are best studied in between-subjects designs. . . The 
difficulties of [within-subjects] designs were noted long ago by Kahneman and Tversky (1982), 
who pointed out that ‘within-subjects designs are associated with significant problems of 
interpretation in several areas of psychological research (Poulton 1975)’” (Kahneman 2002, pp. 
473–474). 
But the apparent tension is resolved when it is pointed out that “intuitive 
judgments” for Kahneman are rapid and automatic, and contrast with “deliberate 
thought processes”, which are slow and involve reflection. Separate evaluation 
may be the right way to study intuitive judgments in Kahneman’s sense, but the 
question under consideration in this section is whether it is better to employ 
“intuitive judgments” or “deliberate thought processes” as evidence for 
contextualism and anti-intellectualism. It is possible to both think that “deliberate 
thought processes” are more rational than “intuitive judgments”, and therefore 
provide better evidence, and also that separate evaluation is the best way to study 
“intuitive judgments”. For further discussion of the distinction between “intuitive” 
and “deliberate” (or type 1 and type 2 processes) in relation to the contextualist 
debate, see Gerken (2012). Thanks to Mikkel Gerken for pointing out the passage 
in Kahneman. 
26 Additional reflection on this idea can be found in Pinillos et al. (2011). Pinillos 
et al. conducted a study of the Knobe Effect, which, unlike Knobe’s original study, 
allowed joint evaluation of scenarios, and found that participants were “less likely 
to give the asymmetric ‘Knobe’ response” (p. 129). Discussing this result, Pinillos 
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Another illustration of how joint evaluation can produce improved 
judgments is given in Kahneman and Tversky (1996) in relation to 
the “conjunction fallacy”. The “conjunction fallacy” is the 
tendency of subjects, in certain conditions, to judge that p&q is 
more probable than p alone. So, for example, consider the 
following vignette and response options (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1996, p. 587): 
Linda is in her early thirties. She is single, outspoken, and very bright. As a 
student she majored in philosophy and was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice. Suppose there are 1,000 women who fit this 
description. How many of them are 
(a) high school teachers?   
(b) bank tellers? or 
  (c) bank tellers and active feminists? 
 
Kahneman and Tversky report that when participants were allowed 
to see options (a), (b) and (c), 64% conformed to the conjunction 
rule, which holds that that conjunctions must be less probable (or 
equally probable) than either conjunct. But in an experiment with a 
between-subjects design (that is, one where subjects consider the 
relevant responses separately), when participants saw only either 
options (a) and (b) or (a) and (c), “the estimates for feminist bank 
tellers (median category: ‘more than 50’) were significantly higher 
than the estimates for bank tellers (median category: ‘13-20,’ p < 
                                                                                                                                                                     
et al. say “we believe that presenting agents with both vignettes (and letting them 
see the range of multiple choice answers) pushes them to think more carefully 
before giving the final judgment. If we compare this with the original Knobe 
experiments (where subjects were given only one vignette followed by just two 
answer options), it is plausible that subjects there were less careful in their 
reasoning” (p. 133). 
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.01 by a Mann-Whitney test)” (p. 587). That is, in the between-
subjects design, when participants were asked to evaluate the 
probability of (b) and (c) separately, they tended to violate the 
conjunction rule, while in the within-subjects design, when they 
were allowed to see both objects jointly, they tended to adhere to 
the rule. 
So there is an argument that supports the idea that we should favor 
data generated by contexts considered jointly over data generated 
by contexts considered separately. And we’re now in a position to 
be able to challenge DeRose’s assumption that 
The best grounds for accepting contextualism come from how knowledge-
attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in ordinary, non-
philosophical talk (DeRose 2005, p. 172/2009, p. 47). 
There is now a competing conception of what might be considered 
“better” grounds for accepting contextualism, namely more 
informed judgments, based on joint evaluation of contexts. Pinillos 
et al. (2011, p. 127) put the idea this way: “In general, giving 
subjects further relevant information will allow them to make a 
more informed judgment. In short, it will put them in a better 
epistemic situation”. 
7 Conclusion: Two Explanatory Projects 
One explanatory project that contextualists and anti-intellectualists 
might be engaged in is a branch of cognitive science. In the case of 
contextualism, this project is closely related to the explanatory 
projects of empirical semantics and pragmatics: The goal is to 
build up a linguistic theory that explains and predicts certain 
linguistic phenomena. Evidence of those phenomena can be 
uncovered by eliciting judgments in linguistic experiments, 
looking at linguistic corpora, and recording and transcribing 
linguistic use “in the wild”. While the immediate goal of this 
project is to explain a domain of specifically linguistic phenomena, 
evidence for and against competing theories also comes from how 
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well theories mesh with neighboring areas of empirical 
investigation. The ultimate goal is a satisfactory explanation of 
“the total speech act in the total speech situation”—how linguistic 
capacities interact with other forms of cognition to produce the 
richly textured conversational understanding we enjoy. This 
explanatory project is essentially focused on language and 
linguistic activity. I think it is uncontroversial that both evidence 
collected from separate and joint evaluation of contexts is relevant 
to this explanatory project. Those engaged in this type of project 
want to know, among other things, why linguistic judgments differ 
in separate and joint evaluation (when they do), and to know that, 
we obviously need both kinds of evidence.27 
The second explanatory project is not essentially focused on 
psychological explanation. It seeks answers to metaphysical 
questions: What is knowledge? What is evidence? We might 
approach those metaphysical questions by way of answers to 
linguistic questions: How do we use the word “know”? Or by way 
of questions about judgments involving the relevant concepts: How 
do people make judgments about how confident someone should 
be? These routes to the nature of knowledge or evidence depend on 
controversial assumptions about the relation between our linguistic 
behavior with “know” or our judgments about confidence and the 
nature of knowledge and evidence. I won’t engage here in disputes 
over the best way to understand that relation.28 Instead, I only want 
                                                        
27 For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1996, p. 587) say that “the between-
subjects design is appropriate when we want to understand ‘pure’ heuristic 
reasoning; the within-subjects design is appropriate when we wish to understand 
how conflicts between rules and heuristics are resolved”, and Stanovich (2011, pp. 
124–5) discusses the way that within- and between-subjects designs may interact 
differently with individual differences in rational thinking dispositions. 
 
28 There are many views about the relation between linguistic facts about “know” 
and the nature of knowledge. Ludlow (2005, p. 13) claims that “any investigation 
into the nature of knowledge which did not conform to some significant degree 
with the semantics of the term “knows” would simply be missing the point. . . 
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to suggest that insofar as one is engaged in the project of getting at 
the nature of knowledge and evidence via linguistic or 
psychological investigations, it makes sense to be interested in the 
best judgments that subjects make about knowledge ascriptions or 
how confident subjects should be, and not exclusively in 
“ordinary” judgments, subject as they are to known forms of bias 
and distortion. If subjects’ judgments are taken to be a mirror of 
reality, that mirror should be as polished as possible. 
So, insofar as contextualists are interested in getting at the nature 
of knowledge, or anti-intellectualists are interested in getting at the 
nature of evidence, in addition to being engaged in an aspect of the 
(extremely worthwhile) project of empirical linguistics and 
psychology, they should drop the commitment to the idea that the 
best grounds for contextualism are offered by ordinary uses of 
knowledge-ascribing (and knowledge-denying) sentences in 
ordinary talk. Better grounds for contextualism and anti-
intellectualism, understood as theories concerning the nature of 
knowledge and evidence, are how speakers use knowledge-
ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences, or make judgments 
about confidence, in situations where all the necessary work has 
been done to eliminate avoidable sources of bias. Employing 
context shifting experiments that ask for joint evaluation of 
contexts is a step towards generating that kind of improved 
                                                                                                                                                                     
epistemological theories might be rejected if they are in serious conflict with the 
lexical semantics of ‘knows’”. And DeRose (2009, p. 19) says that “It’s essential 
to a credible epistemology, as well as to a responsible account of the semantics of 
the relevant epistemologically important sentences, that what’s pro- posed about 
knowledge and one’s claims about the semantics of ‘know(s)’ work plausibly 
together. . . ”. In contrast, Sosa (2000, p. 3) argues that epistemic contextualism as 
a “a thesis in linguistics or in philosophy of language” is plausible, but its interest 
as a theory of knowledge “is limited in certain ways” (p. 8), and for an argument in 
favor of a “divorce for the linguistic theory of knowledge attributions and 
traditional epistemology”, see (Hazlett, 2010, p. 500)—though see Stokke (2012) 
for a criticism of the reasons Hazlett offers in favor of the divorce. 
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evidence. 
In summary, whether contextualists and anti-intellectualists take 
themselves to be engaged in the cognitive scientific or the 
metaphysical explanatory project (or both), they should be 
interested in—and cannot dismiss as mere experimental artifacts—
responses to contexts evaluated jointly. Moreover, experimental 
results that show no significant effect of changing stakes on 
judgments when those contexts are evaluated separately (e.g. 
Buckwalter 2010, Buckwalter and Schaffer forthcoming, Feltz and 
Zarpentine 2010, Phelan 2013) don’t pose a serious challenge to 
anti-intellectualism, since there is reason to think that what’s at 
stake in a context is a difficult-to-evaluate attribute the effects of 
which emerge most clearly in joint evaluation of contexts. 
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